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INTRODUCTION

After being on the agenda of five different Congresses and a decade of
political battles,' the revised bankruptcy legislation became law with the
passage of The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
of 2005 (BAPCPA) 2 on April 20, 2005.' Although the road to bankruptcy
reform was long, 4 the road to put the reform into practice, so that the Bankruptcy Code 5 works in a practical fashion, is going to be much longer, and
probably quite bumpy.
Prior to the passage of BAPCPA, practitioners, judges, and scholars
debated the "ins and outs" of BAPCPA in countless seminars and scholarly
efforts. Some praise BAPCPA, 6 and others decry it.7 The view one has of
BAPCPA is largely based on their perspective of the underlying cause of
the upsurge in case filings 8 over the last decade or so.9 Regardless of how
1. For a general discussion of the political battles over bankruptcy reform in the
1990s, see Melissa B. Jacoby, Negotiating Bankruptcy Legislation Through the News Media,
41 Hous. L. REv. 1091 (2004), and Robert J. Landry, III, The Policy and Forces Behind
Consumer Bankruptcy Reform: A Classic Battle Over Problem Definition, 33 U. MEM. L.
REv. 509 (2003).
2.
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of chapter 11 of
the United States Code).
3.
The bill was passed by the Senate on March 10, 2005, and the House of Repre-

sentatives on April 14, 2005. WILLIAMs HouSTON BROWN & LAWRENCE R. AHERN III, 2005
BANKRUPTCY REFORM LEGISLATION WITH ANALYsIS 1 (2005).
4.
For a detailed discussion of the legislative history, see Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer ProtectionAct of 2005, 79
AM. BANKR. L.J. 485 (2005).
5.
11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1527 (2006). Unless otherwise noted, all references to Bankruptcy Code, Code, or section, are to title 11 of the United States Code.
6.
For example, those who favor the legislation characterize it as "a substantial
success in preserving the bankruptcy relief for those who need it while reducing fraud and
abuse." Oversight of the Implementation of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
ProtectionAct: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Administrative Oversight and the Courts,
110th
Cong.
(2006),
available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/heaings/testimony.cfm?renderforprint=l&id=2442&wit id=5934.
7.
See Charles J. Tabb, The Death of Consumer Bankruptcy in the United States?,
18 BANKR. DEv. J. 1, 46-47 (2001) (detailing many of the mainstream media stories and
editorials that strongly opposed bankruptcy reform-even the title of his article gives an
indication of one point of view of bankruptcy reform).
8.
See Michelle J. White, Abuse or Protection?Economics of Bankruptcy Reform
Under BAPCPA, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 275, 284-85 (2007) (reporting yearly consumer bankruptcy filings from 1980 to 2005, nominally and by percent of the United States population).
From 1995 to 2005, consumer filings have gone from 874,642 to 2,000,000. Id. As a percent
of the U.S. population, this represents an increase from 0.33% in 1995 to 0.68% in 2005. Id.
For more detailed information regarding bankruptcy filing numbers, see JAMES C. DUFF,
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTs, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, 2006, at 22-24
(n.d.), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/library/annualreports.htm.

20091

THE MEANS TEST

BAPCPA is viewed from a policy perspective, we are now in the postBAPCPA era, and it is now that the rubber hits the road. 10
The impact of BAPCPA on the bankruptcy system's ability to effectively address the financial distress of individual consumer debtors is unknown. 1 As in many policy areas where there is widespread reform to an
existing, complex statutory scheme, the courts will have to clarify and interpret the words of the statute so that the new changes are workable. The
courts have begun to work through BAPCPA and to address many of the
thornier consumer issues.1 2 The courts, with each decision, are interpreting

For an excellent example of the divergent views on the causal factors leading to
9.
the increased consumer fillings rate, see Elizabeth Warren, Jay Lawrence Westbrook &
Theresa Sullivan, Less Stigma or More Financial Distress: An Empirical Analysis of the
2006),
Paper,
Filings (Working
Bankruptcy
Extraordinary Increase in
http://ssm.com/abstract=903355 (highlighting two very different perspectives of the reason
for increased filings: less stigma with more people abusing the system or more financial
distress).
President George W. Bush's explanation at the signing ceremony for BAPCPA
represents, in a nutshell, the view of the proponents of reform and their opinion of why the
reform is necessary. President Bush stated:
In recent years, too many people have abused the bankruptcy laws. They've walked away from debts even when they
had the ability to repay them. This has made credit less affordable and less accessible, especially for low-income workers
who already face financial obstacles.
The bill I sign today helps address this problem. Under
the new law, Americans who have the ability to pay will be
required to pay back at least a portion of their debts.... This
practical reform will help ensure that debtors make a goodfaith effort to repay as much as they can afford.
In re Richie, 353 B.R. 569, 580-81 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006) (quoting Press Release, White
House Press Office, President Signs Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention, Consumer Protection
Act (Apr. 20, 2005)).
As Professor Wilson Freyermuth said regarding the bankruptcy system after
10.
BAPCPA, "We have the system we have." R. Wilson Freyermuth, Crystas, Mud, BAPCPA,
and the Structure of Bankruptcy Decisionmaking, 71 Mo. L. REv. 1069, 1078 (2006). In
essence, all participants in the system must deal with the cards dealt by Congress and work
through the changes.
See, e.g., Melissa B. Jacoby, Ripple or Revolution? The Indeterminacy of Statu11.
tory Bankruptcy Reform, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 169, 170 (2005) (recognizing that the "real life
impact" of bankruptcy reform is unclear). From a larger perspective, it is unknown if there
will be any meaningful change from BAPCPA in the long-run. See, e.g., Robert M. Lawless,
The Paradoxof Consumer Credit, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 347, 348 (2007) ("At the big picture
level, however, it is not clear that the law changes much of anything.").
For an excellent treatment of the early cases after the passage of BAPCPA that
12.
address many of the thorny issues, see George H. Singer, The Year in Review: Case Law
Developments Under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005, 82 N.D. L. REV. 297 (2006).
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and carrying out the provisions of the statute. 13 This role of the courts, as
well as the role that other players in the bankruptcy
system play, 14 will
15
era.
shape consumer bankruptcy in the post-BAPCPA
There are scores of doctrinal changes to the Bankruptcy Code,' 6 but
among the more challenging areas in consumer bankruptcy has been working through the complex statutory framework of the means test.' 7 The
courts, debtors, creditors, trustees, Bankruptcy Administrators (BA), and
U.S. Trustees (UST)' 8 are incrementally working through the statutory
scheme as cases present themselves.' 9 The "blind legislative formula" 20
determining chapter 7 eligibility is riddled with gaps and inconsistencies. 2,
Many issues are likely resolved without requiring bankruptcy courts to
weigh in, but a body of case law pertaining to § 707(b) is developing.2 2
13.
In the post-BAPCPA era, there will be three kinds of decisions that have to be
considered when approaching bankruptcy issues. First, there will be areas where there is no
controlling authority. In this area, we will see new decisions interpreting the amendments to
the Code. This is the focus of this paper. Second, some decisions will no longer be valid in
light of BAPCPA. Third, some substantive decisions handed down prior to BAPCPA will
still be good law and will control the outcome of some issues. See Brad A. Goergen, The
Post-Reform Bankruptcy Code: is it Just a Pig in a Dress?, THE ADVOCATE (Idaho), Jan.
2006, at 15, 15.
14.
These players include, among others, the attorneys, United States Trustees,
United States Bankruptcy Administrators, creditors, governmental agencies, and trustees.
Each will shape the law as they work through the amendments.
15.
See Jacoby, supra note 11, at 189 (recognizing the filtering effect of the day-today actors in the bankruptcy system).
16.
Lawless, supra note 11, at 348 ("At the doctrinal level, the new statute changes
many things. The amendments enact a new means test for consumers in chapter 7, credit
counseling requirements, paperwork and filing duties, notice rules, substantive changes to
priorities and payouts, and a host of other doctrinal changes.").
17.
11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2006); see infra notes 36-94 and accompanying text.
18.
The United States Trustee program operates in all judicial districts other than
those in Alabama and North Carolina, which have the United States Bankruptcy Administrator program. Both agencies perform largely the same functions in the administration and
oversight of the bankruptcy system. For a discussion of the role and function of both programs, see Dan J. Schulman, Constitutionalityof the United States Trustee/Bankruptcy AdministratorPrograms,4 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 319 (1995); Dan J.Schulman, The Constitution, Interest Groups, and the Requirement of Uniformity: The United States Trustee and the
Bankruptcy AdministratorPrograms,74 NEB. L. REV. 91 (1995).
19.
The incremental nature of the maturation of the law will lead to a host of inconsistent decisions and will take years to resolve, if it can even ever be resolved, by the appellate courts. As one scholar has recognized, "The legislation remains, however, in its infancy
and a maturation of the law will be necessary to resolve the numerous questions of statutory
interpretation and legislative intent." Singer, supra note 12, at 411.
20. In re Barraza, 346 B.R. 724, 729 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006).
21.
The very standard itself, "abuse," is sufficiently vague and muddy. See Freyermuth, supra note 10, at 1071-72.
22.
See, e.g., Thomas R. Waldron & Neil M. Berman, Principled Principles of
Statutory Interpretation:A Judicial Perspective After Two Years of BAPCPA, 81 AM.
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With each decision, the courts shape bankruptcy policy in the postBAPCPA era.23 It is hoped that awareness of these decisions can guide all
players to resolve disputes by consent without the necessity of the bankruptcy court. 24 It can also provide a starting point to analyze the impact of
the means test in day-to-day application. This is a necessary step, as is solid
empirical research, 25 before any reforms to the means test are to be seriously considered.
As the title indicates, the focus of this paper is on dismissal of individual chapter 7 cases when the detailed means test is inapplicable because a
L.J. 195, 195-96 (2007) (recognizing that there are a growing number of decisions in
a wide array of areas under BAPCPA, but the differences in their outcomes are so varied that
there is no way to have any predictability or uniformity in outcomes in individual cases).
It is interesting to examine how the courts shape BAPCPA because the new
23.
legislation tends to limit the discretion of judges with more rules, such as the means test. It
also limits the ability of debtors to choose the most appropriate chapter of relief. Discretion
and flexibility, with certain limits and statutory checks and balances, had been important in
the pre-BAPCPA era to enable the Bankruptcy Code to act as a safety valve for financial
distress. For a discussion of the safety valve role of consumer bankruptcy, see Steven H.
Kropp, The Safety Valve Status of Consumer Bankruptcy Law: The Decline of Unions as a
PartialExplanation for the Dramatic Increase in Consumer Bankruptcies, 7 VA. J. SOC.
POL'Y & L. 1, 4-5 (1999).
24. Of course, as pointed out by Professor Freyermuth, with ninety-four districts,
and with bankruptcy, district, courts of appeals, bankruptcy appellate panels, and the Supreme Court, reaching a consensus on thorny issues will take a great deal of time. Freyermuth, supra note 10, at 1073-75. Professor Freyermuth is correct, but bankruptcy practice is
very localized. Decisions by local courts, as well as accepted local norms or typical outcomes in certain cases, can have an effect of guiding the players to resolve similar disputes
in the future. Additionally, the costs of appealing most bankruptcy decisions are prohibitive
in routine cases and can act as an incentive to reach resolution without going through the
appellate process.
The localized nature of bankruptcy practice arises in several ways. First, the
promulgation of local procedural rules by bankruptcy courts around the nation leads to a
localism in terms of procedures in a particular district. See, e.g., Mary Josephine Newborn
Wiggins, Globalism, Parochialismand Procedure:A CriticalAssessment of Local Rulemaking in Bankruptcy Court, 46 S.C. L. REv. 1245 (1995) (recognizing the promulgation of
local rules around the country). Beyond local bankruptcy rules adopted on a district-wide
basis, judges often have their own rules that pertain to their court only. Rules by courts and
guidelines by the U.S. Trustees, Bankruptcy Administrators, and clerks of court can add to
the localized nature of bankruptcy practice. A second factor leading to localized bankruptcy
practice arises from a "local legal culture," which has been evolving over time from the
interested parties in the bankruptcy system: judges, clerks, trustees, and practitioners. For a
general empirical analysis of this evolution, see Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay
Lawrence Westbrook, The Persistence of Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence
from the FederalBankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 801 (1994).
25.
See, e.g., Katherine Porter, The Potential and Peril of BAPCPA for Empirical
Research, 71 Mo. L. REv. 963 (2006) (recognizing a whole host of policy areas that intersect
with the bankruptcy system and the importance of empirical research on the relationship
between those areas and consumer bankruptcy).
BANKR.
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debtor falls within a safe harbor, 26 the debtor passes the means test, 27 or the
debtor is able to rebut the presumption of abuse. 28 The focus is not on presumption of abuse cases and a detailed analysis of the mechanics of the
means test. The reason for this focus is twofold. First, the detailed means
test is not applicable to most debtors since most fall within the safe harbor
of having too low of an income. 29 As such, the presumption of abuse never
will arise. The avenue for review of these cases is under generalized
abuse. 30 Second, debtors who must complete the means test, the abovemedian-income debtors, are those where the possibility of abuse is more
likely to exist, rather than the below-median-income debtors. The abovemedian-income debtors naturally have more money and assets than most
debtors. They, therefore, likely have more of an ability and reason to use
the means testing calculations in a way that avoids the appearance of abuse,
or at least rebuts the presumption of abuse. It is in these cases where abuse,
if any, is likely to occur. As such, the focus of this paper is primarily on
situations where the debtor has moved beyond the means test and overcome
any resulting presumptions, so that the case is analyzed for abuse under
section 707(b)(1) and 707(b)(3) 31 or for possible dismissal for cause under
section 707(a).32 In such situations, the safe harbor, passage of the means
test, or rebutting the presumption of abuse may not be enough for the debtor
to get the relief they seek.
Prior to directly addressing that area, a brief overview of the means
test and presumption of abuse is necessary. The framework leading to application of the means test is required to fully understand the "ins and outs"
of the generalized abuse analysis. Following that overview, which includes
a discussion of several of the thornier issues in the application of the means
test, is a discussion of dismissal of cases for abuse under the bad faith
and/or totality of the circumstances standards. A brief discussion of opportunities for possible dismissal under § 707(a) 33 for individual debtors with
primarily business debts or consumer debtors in which § 707(b) 34 analysis
is not useful will follow. Finally, the paper concludes with some observations and areas that need further research.
26.
See infra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
27.
See infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
28.
Even if abuse is presumed, a debtor can rebut the presumption. 11 U.S.C. §
707(b)(2)(B) (2006); see infra notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
29.
See Jerry D. Truitt, The State of Bankruptcy 18 Months After BAPCPA, AM.
BANKR. INST. J., Dec.-Jan. 2007, at 52, 52 (recognizing that ninety-four percent of cases filed
were by debtors below the applicable state's median income).
30. See discussion infra Part Il.
31.
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1), (3) (2006).

32.
33.
34.

11 U.S.C. § 707(a) (2006).
11 U.S.C. § 707(a) (2006).

11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1), (3) (2006).
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II.

OVERVIEW OF THE MEANS TEST AND THE PRESUMPTION OF
ABUSE

The means test is a complex statutory scheme that applies a presumption of abuse in chapter 7 cases if it is determined that the debtor could repay a portion of their general unsecured debts.35 The presumption of abuse
is determined by the debtor's ability to repay a portion of their general unsecured debts.3 If the presumption arises, the debtor cannot
obtain relief
37
under chapter 7 without showing special circumstances exist.
Prior to considering the application of the means test, an analysis of
the threshold requirements and safe harbor provisions is necessary. If the
threshold requirements are met, an analysis of the safe harbor provisions is
then required. If the threshold requirements are met and no safe harbor provisions apply, then a substantive means test analysis applies. Then, even if
the presumption of abuse does not arise or is rebutted, dismissal for abuse,
the focus of this paper, or possibly dismissal for cause should be considered.
A.

THRESHOLD REQUIREMENTS

Section 707(b)(1) provides that a chapter 7 case filed by an individual
debtor whose debts are primarily consumer debts shall be dismissed if the
court determines that the filing constitutes an abuse. 38 It is important to recognize two threshold requirements before analyzing whether a case is subject to dismissal for abuse: (1) individual debtor (2) whose debts are "pri35.
In re Haar, 360 B.R. 759, 761 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007) ("[T]he function of [the
means test] is to determine whether a debtor has the means available to repay his or her
obligations.").
36.
Id.("The actual mechanics of the test are highly detailed and rigid,... [y]et, the
overall concept of the test is simple; if a debtor's income exceeds his or her necessary expenses by certain predetermined thresholds, a presumption that the debtor is abusing the
bankruptcy process will arise.").
37.
Essentially, the means test is a methodology to determine if a chapter 7 debtor
can fund a plan under chapter 13 and, if so, to dismiss the case or convert the case to chapter
13. See, e.g., Richard L. Wiener, Susan Block-Lieb, Karen Gross & Corinne BaronDonovan, Unwrapping Assumptions: Applying Social Analytic Jurisprudence to Consumer
Bankruptcy Education Requirements and Policy, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 453, 458 (2005)
("BAPCPA seeks to curb access ... to chapter 7 ... by imposing an income-based test intended to insure that only those individual debtors who could not repay their unsecured debt
through a repayment plan are entitled to access chapter 7."). For a detailed explanation of the
mechanics of the means test, see Eugene R. Wedoff, Means Testing in the New § 707(b), 79
AM. BANKR. L.J. 231 (2005), and Robert J. Landry, III & Nancy H. Mardis, Consumer Bankruptcy Reform: Debtors' Prison Without Bars or "Just Desserts" for Deadbeats?, 36
GoLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 91, 107-12 (2006).
38.
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1) (2006).
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marily consumer debts., 39 Note, as discussed below in part IV, if the
threshold requirements of the means test are not met so that § 707(b) is inapplicable, debtors may be subject
to dismissal on the grounds enumerated
' '4
in § 707(a), including "cause.
1.

Individual Debtor

First, the debtor must be an individual; however, "individual" is not
defined in the Bankruptcy Code.41 Undefined words in the Bankruptcy
Code are given their plain meaning, unless such a meaning would lead to "a
result demonstrably at odds with the intention of its drafters. '' 2 Applying
this standard to the term "individual," courts generally limit the term to
"natural persons," not corporations or other legal entities. 3 As such, the §
707(b) dismissal for abuse does not apply to corporate, partnership, or other
legal-entity debtors. 44
2.

PrimarilyConsumerDebts

Second, if an individual debtor's debts are not primarily consumer, the
debtor is not subject to the means test and, in fact, does not need to file Official Form B22A,45 which contains the means test calculation. 46 Disputes
may arise regarding whether a debtor has "primarily consumer debts." This
is because "consumer debt" is defined in the Code, 47 whereas "primarily" is
not.
39. Id.
40.
See In re Sudderth, No. 06-10660, 2007 WL 119141, at *1-*2 (Bankr.
M.D.N.C. Jan. 9, 2007).
41.
In re JAC Family Found., 356 B.R. 554, 555 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2006).
42.
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-42 (1989) (citing
Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)).
43.
See Jove Eng'g, Inc. v. IRS (In re Jove Eng'g, Inc.), 92 F.3d 1539, 1550-51
( lIth Cir. 1996).
44.
Charles J. Tabb & Jillian K. McClelland, Living With the Means Test, 31 S. ILL.
U. L.J. 463,468 (2007).

45.

INTERIM FED. R. BANKR.

P. 1007(b)(4) (2006).

46.
Although it appears that interim rule 1007(b)(4) does not require Form 22A to
be filed in this instance, several courts have reached different conclusions when addressing
this issue. For the divergent views on this issue, see In re Beacher, 358 B.R. 917, 919-21
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007) (finding that Form B22A is not required unless the debtor has primarily consumer debts), In re Copeland, No. 06032116-H3-7, 2006 WL 2578877, at *2
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. Sept. 5, 2006) (addressing the In re Moates case and finding that §
521(a)(l)(b)(v) requires a statement of current monthly income and is not limited to individuals with primarily consumer debts; the court concluded that individual chapter 7 debtors
with primarily business debts were required to file Official Form B22A), and In re Moates,
338 B.R. 716 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006).
47.
11 U.S.C. § 101(8) (2006).
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Section 101(8) defines "consumer debt" as a "debt incurred by an individual primarily for a personal, family, or household purpose"a 8 The test
used by most courts in examining whether a particular debt is a consumer
debt is "whether it was incurred with an eye for profit. 4 9 This test is derived from jurisprudence regarding the definition of consumer debt in the
Truth in Lending Act, 50 since the definition
of consumer debt in the Code is
51
derived from consumer protection law.
Most courts define "primarily consumer debt" as "more than 50% of
the amount of debt is consumer debt, without regard to whether more than
50% of the number of debts is consumer debt. 52 However, the Fifth Circuit
found that beyond a consideration of the amount of consumer debt in relation to nonconsumer debt, the number of consumer debts should be considered.53 Other courts look at the amount of consumer debt and consider the
number of debts in the event that the amount of consumer and nonconsumer
debt are equal. 54
48. Id.
49. In re Booth, 858 F.2d 1051, 1054 (5th Cir. 1988); see also In re Bell, 65 B.R.
575, 577 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986); In re Almendinger, 56 B.R. 97 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1985).
50. In re Booth, 858 F.2d at 1054-55.
51.
"[The] definition [of consumer debt] is adapted from the definition used in
various consumer protection laws." S. REP. No. 95-989, at 22 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5808.
52. In re Beacher, 358 B.R. 917, 920 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007) (applying such a
definition in the post-BAPCPA era). For similar holdings prior to BAPCPA, which would
still be applicable, see Stewart v. U.S. Tr. (In re Stewart), 175 F.3d 796, 808 (10th Cir.
1999), where in a substantial abuse case, which has the same language as in the current Code
section, the court applied a plain meaning of the word "primarily," defining it as "meaning
consumer debt exceeding fifty percent of the total debt," Zolg v. Kelly, 841 F.2d 908, 913
(9th Cir. 1988) ("'Primarily' means 'for the most part."' Thus, when 'the most part'-i.e.,
more than half--of the dollar amount owed is consumer debt, the statutory threshold is
passed."), and In re Price, 353 F.3d 1135, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that over half the
debt was consumer debt, satisfying the primarily consumer debt requirement).
53.
In re Booth, 858 F.2d at 1055.
54. In re Bell, 65 B.R. 575, 577-78 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986). The court articulated
the test as follows:
The Court concludes that it is appropriate in defining the phrase
"primarily consumer debt" to give more weight to the portion of total
debt that is consumer debt and less weight to the portion of the total
number of debts that are consumer debts. Thus, where the total amount
of the consumer debt is substantially less than the total amount of nonconsumer debt, the debts cannot be considered primarily consumer
debts, even if there is a greater number of consumer debts. On the other
hand, when the amount of the consumer debt is substantially greater than
the amount of the non-consumer debt, the debts must be considered primarily consumer debts even if there is a greater number of nonconsumer debts. Finally, when the consumer debt and the non-consumer
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SAFE HARBOR PROVISIONS

If the threshold requirements are satisfied, it is necessary to consider
the safe harbor provisions in § 707(b). The Code provides two specific
safe harbors from the full application of the means test and the possibility
of a presumption of abuse for individual debtors with primarily consumer
debts: (1) debtors with income below the median household income in their
state, and (2) disabled veterans in very limited circumstances. 56 Even if a
debtor satisfies a safe harbor provision so that the means test and resulting
presumption are not applicable, as discussed in part Ill, the debtor may be
subject to dismissal for abuse under § 707(b)(1)5 7 and § 707(b)(3), 58 or possibly even under § 707(a).5 9
1.

CurrentMonthly Income Below Median State Income

When the product of a debtor's current monthly income (CMI) 6° and
twelve exceeds the applicable state median household income, the debtor is
subject to the means test.61 Conversely, when the product of a debtor's CMI
and twelve is below the applicable state median household income, the
debtor is not subject to the means test or the possibly resulting presumption
of abuse.62 In such instances, the debtor falls within a "safe harbor" from
application of the mechanics of the detailed means test.63
It is important to recognize that the accuracy of the CMI figure in
situations where the CMI is just below the median household income in the
state is very important. Calculation of CMI is supposed to be based on a
debtor's household income for the full six months of pay in the calculation;
however, obtaining this data may be difficult, and the result may be the
debts are approximately equal, the Court should consider the relative
numbers of consumer and non-consumer debts.
Id. at 577-78.
55.
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(D), (b)(7) (2006).
56.
Id.
57.
Dismissal is proper if granting relief would be an abuse of the provisions of
chapter 7.
58.
Dismissal is proper if the petition was filed in bad faith or the circumstances
surrounding the debtor's financial situation indicate abuse.
59.
Dismissal is proper for prejudicial delays, failure to pay fees, or failure to furnish required information.
60.
11 U.S.C. § 101(10A) (2006) (stating that current monthly income is the
debtor's average monthly income for the six calendar months prior to the filing of the bankruptcy case).
61.
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A) (2006).
62.
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(7) (2006).
63.
See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRutrcY I 707.05[2][b] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J.
Sommer eds., 15th ed. rev. 2008) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(7) (2006)).
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usage of pay information outside of the prior six months or a failure to include nondebtor spouse income. Using incorrect or incomplete data distorts
the accuracy of CMI.64 In some instances, the safe harbor may not actually
be applicable to debtors that, on the face of the petition, appear to be belowmedian-income debtors. Therefore, those debtors should be subject to application of the means test.65 Furthermore, even if the debtors pass the
means test on its face, if the calculation of CMI was materially incorrect,
that may be a relevant factor, in the context of a particular case, to an analysis under § 707(b)(1) and (3).
2.

Disabled Veterans

Disabled veterans may also fall within a very limited "safe harbor"
from application of the means test. If the disabled veteran's indebtedness
occurred primarily during a period when the veteran was on active duty or
performing a homeland defense activity, the disabled veteran is not subject
to the means test. 66 Official Form 22A has a box for debtors to certify that
they fall within this exception.
This initially appears to provide real relief to disabled veterans, however, upon closer review, it does not.67 The veteran must have been "dis7°
'69
abled,, 68 on "active duty, or "performing a homeland defense activity
at the time the debtor incurred the debt. Each of these terms has a specific
statutory definition, and when each is read together, the actual relief available to veterans appears limited.7 ' With that said, it is unclear exactly who
will challenge this or verify the accuracy of such a certification.72
It may be necessary to review the pay advices and/or tax documents, which can
64.
help assess the accuracy of CMI. Practitioners should be prepared to show how the calculation was arrived at.
The old aphorism of "garbage in, garbage out" can be applied to the means test
65.
results when the initial CMI figures used are incorrect.
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(D)(i)-(ii) (2006). In such instances, the veteran debtor does
66.
not need to complete the detailed means test calculations of Official Form 22A. See INTERIM
FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(b)(4) (2006); see also In re Galyon, 336 B.R. 164, 166 (Bankr.
W.D. Okla.2007).
David Gray Carlson, Means Testing: The Failed Bankruptcy Revolution of
67.
2005, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 223, 292-94 (2007) (explaining the inherent problems
and limitations of this purported protection to veterans).
38 U.S.C. § 3741(1) (2006).
68.
38 U.S.C. § 101(21) (2006).
69.
32 U.S.C. § 901(1) (2006).
70.

The conjunctive nature of the statutory requirement will make it difficult for the
71.
exclusion, particularly the requirement that the debt actually be incurred while the disabled
veteran was on active duty or performing a homeland defense activity.
72. The U.S. BAPCPA Trustee training manual expects trustees to verify the veteran status. See David W. Allard & Katherine R. Catanese, Presentation at the ABI Central
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MEANS TEST GENERALLY

If the threshold requirements are satisfied and the safe harbor provisions do not apply, the debtor must complete the detailed means test. 73 A
detailed examination of the mechanics of the means test is beyond the scope
of this paper; 74 however, a review of several of the thornier issues is provided below in part II. What follows is a cursory overview of the process.
The means test is really a two-step test: (1) a median income test, and
(2) a repayment test.75 The median income test is one of the safe harbors set
forth above in part II.B. If the debtor's CMI times twelve (Annualized Current Monthly Income, or ACMI) is equal to or below a state's applicable
median family income, the debtor passes the means test.76 The debtor is in a
safe harbor and is not subject to the detailed means test and the possibly
resulting presumption of abuse.
However, debtors with ACMI above the median income must calculate their ability to repay a portion of their unsecured debts based on their
CMI, less allowed deductions, which constitutes the repayment test.77 If a
debtor's monthly disposable income (MDI), less CMI allowable expenses,
multiplied by sixty, is greater than $10,000, then the debtor fails the means
test and must file chapter 13.78 If the product of the MDI and sixty is beStates Bankruptcy Workshop: Advanced Means Testing Issues: What Can Be Done to Make
the Process More Efficient and Easier to Use? (July 15-18, 2006) (transcript available at
www.abiworld.org).
73.
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i)-(iv) (2006).
74.
The means test essentially determines if a chapter 7 debtor can fund a plan
under chapter 13. For a detailed explanation of the mechanics of the means test, along with
application of the test to hypothetical debtors, see Robert J. Landry, III & Nancy H. Mardis,
Consumer Bankruptcy Reform: Debtors' Prison Without Bars or "Just Desserts" for Deadbeats?, 36 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 91, 107-12 (2006). Landry and Mardis provide the
following summary of the means test:
If a debtor can pay $100 a month and has $24,000 in unsecured debt, the
bankruptcy filing will be presumed an abuse of Chapter 7. Over a 60month period this will fund a repayment plan with $6000, which is 25%
of the unsecured general debt. Then, on the high end, if the debtor has
$166.66 a month to pay and has at least $39,998.40 in general unsecured
debt, it will also be presumed to be an abuse of Chapter 7. Over a 60month period this will fund a repayment plan with $9999.60, which is
25% of the unsecured general debt.
Landry & Mardis, supra note 37, at 109-10. If the case is presumed an abuse and the debtor
does not rebut the presumption, the case will be dismissed, unless the debtor voluntarily
converts the case to one under chapter 11 or chapter 13. Id. at 108. For other detailed treatments of the means test, see Eugene R. Wedoff, Means Testing in the New § 707(b), 79 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 231 (2005).
75.
See White, supra note 8, at 285-86.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78.
Id.
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tween $6000 and $10,000, the debtor can remain in chapter 7, provided that
the above result is less than twenty-five percent of their unsecured debt.79
Further, if the product of MDI and sixty is less than $6000, the debtor can
remain in chapter 7 regardless of the amount of their unsecured debt.8 °
Additionally, it is important to recognize that the substantive calculations of the means test are riddled with problems, in part due to the fact that
CMI is based on historic income information 81 and because allowable expenses include actual and Internal Revenue Service standards for expenses. 82 Therefore, an accurate assessment of the debtor's financial situation is not always reached. 83 Instead, what results is often an inaccurate
assessment of a debtor's ability to repay a portion of his debts. 84 Sometimes
the results can work in favor of higher-income debtors seeking chapter 7
relief. 85 The inherent problems in the substantive means testing calculations
bolster the need to carefully review the accuracy of CMI in close cases in
which the debtor's ACMI puts him or her just under the abuse threshold.

Id.
79.
Id.
80.
CMI is actually the debtor's six month average income. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A)
81.
(2006).
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iv) (2006). For a concise discussion of the ex82.
penses, see Eugene Wedoff, Major Consumer Bankruptcy Effects of BAPCPA, 2007 U. ILL.
L. REv. 31, 49-52 (2007).
83.
The expenses are a combination of actual and presumed deductions calculated
based on Internal Revenue Service living expenses standards and, as such, may not be the
actual expenses a debtor incurs. This fact, coupled with the definition of CMI, shows that
passing the means test does not necessarily provide an accurate picture of a debtor's financial condition. In such instances, dismissal under the "totality of the financial circumstances"
standard may be applicable. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3)(A) (2006); see, e.g., In re Paret, 347 B.R.
12 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) ("As is manifest in section 707, a safe harbor upon entry into
which neither one's motives nor fitness for chapter 7 relief are questioned is hardly one
Congress sought to dredge. When no presumption of abuse arises under paragraph (b)(2), the
Court concludes that the Code mandates consideration of a debtor's ability to pay his creditors within the test articulated in paragraph (b)(3).").
Eugene R. Wedoff, JudicialDiscretion to Find Abuse Under § 707(b)(3), 71
84.
Mo. L. REv. 1035, 1047-49 (2006) (recognizing that both current monthly income under the
means test and allowable deductions under the means test may very well provide an inaccurate assessment of the debtor's financial condition).
85.
Judge Wedoff provides an excellent hypothetical example of a CEO who loses
his job shortly before filing and how the means test calculation likely would result in no
presumption of abuse, i.e., passing the means test. However, if the actual financial situation
was examined, the debtor may very well be able to repay a significant portion of their unsecured debts. See id. at 1035-37, 1051.

NORTHERN ILLJNOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

D.

SELECTED PRESUMED ABUSE DECISIONS-§ 707(B)(2)

1.

Reductions of "Current Monthly Income "-401K Loans-§
707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I)
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Under § 707(b), a debtor's "current monthly income" is reduced by
certain expenses; this is the net "current monthly income" used for determining whether the debtor must repay unsecured creditors. The expenses
that the debtor deducts from "current monthly income" are those in existence on the filing date, and include typical living expenses. Specifically, §
707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) provides that debtors may deduct from current monthly
income "the debtor's actual monthly expenses for the categories specified
as Other Necessary Expenses issued by the Internal Revenue Service for the
area in which the debtor resides. 86
Recently, an issue arose as to whether 401(k) loan repayments are
"Other Necessary Expenses" under § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I), so that such repayments could be deducted in determining the debtor's net "current87
monthly income." The bankruptcy court in the case of In re Barraza
found that such expenses are not included as other necessary expenses if the
only consequence of defaulting on such loans is treating the loans as a taxable distribution. The court reasoned that the loans may be required under
the 401(k) plan but, relying on the Internal Revenue Service Manual, found
that repayment of 401(k) loans is not included as a deduction. 8 The court
recognized the inconsistent treatment of the repayment of 401(k) loans in a
chapter 7 means test analysis with how those repayments are treated under
chapter 13.89 In chapter 13, those repayments are permitted under § 1322(f)
and do not constitute disposable income under § 1325.90
2.

Reductions of "CurrentMonthly Income" -Payments for Collateral
Intended To Be Surrendered-§ 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)

As discussed above, a debtor's "current monthly income" is reduced
by certain expenses, and it is the net "current monthly income" that is used
for determining whether the debtor can repay unsecured creditors. Section
707(b)(2)(A)(iii) provides for a deduction of the average monthly payments
for priority and secured debts. Under § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii), "average monthly
payments" for secured debt is calculated as follows:

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (2006).
In re Barraza, 346 B.R. 724 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006).
Id. at 730.
Id. at 731.
Id.
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The debtor's average monthly payments on account of secured debts shall be calculated as the sum of-(I) the total
of all amounts scheduled as contractually due to secured
creditors in each month of the 60 months following the date
of the petition; and (II) any additional payments to secured
creditors necessary for the debtor, in filing a plan under
chapter 13 of this title, to maintain possession of the debtor's primary residence, motor vehicle, or other property
necessary for the support of the debtor and the debtor's dependents, that serves as collateral for secured debts; divided by 60.91
In an early post-BAPCPA case, In re Walker,92 the court was presented with the question of how to interpret the statutory language of §
707(b)(2)(A)(iii), pertaining to the deduction of "average monthly payments" for secured debts from "current monthly income," when the debtor
surrenders the collateral after filing the petition. By surrendering the collateral, the debtor will not be making the secured payments postpetition. The
U.S. Trustee argued that courts should take this fact into account and not
permit the deduction of secured payments from "current monthly income"
in this context. The court agreed with the debtors' position and applied the
plain meaning of the statutory language.93 Since the secured payment
amounts are "scheduled as contractually due" as of the filing date, the
debtor can make the deduction even if the secured debts are not reaffirmed. 94 The court recognized that this interpretation leads to an inaccurate picture of the debtors' postpetition financial condition, but concluded
that this result is "not a sufficient basis upon which to conclude that the
plain language of the statute produces an absurd result. 95 Other courts have
reached similar conclusions. 96
As in many areas of bankruptcy law, bankruptcy courts reach different
conclusions. This issue is no different; several courts have reached different

91.
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2006) (emphasis added).
92.
In re Walker, No. 05-15010-WHD, 2006 WL 1314125, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
May 1, 2006).
93.
Id. at *3.
94.
Id. at *4.
95.
Id. at *6.
96.
See In re Haar, 360 B.R. 759 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007); In re Sorrell, 359 B.R.
167 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2007); In re Zak, 361 B.R. 481 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007); In re
Randle, 358 B.R. 360 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 2006); In re Nockerts, 357 B.R. 497 (Bankr. E.D.
Wis. 2006); In re Simmons, 357 B.R. 480 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2006); In re Singletary, 354
B.R. 455, 468 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006); In re Hartwick, 352 B.R. 867 (Bankr. D. Minn.
2006), affd in part, rev'd in part, 373 B.R. 645 (D. Minn. 2007).
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conclusions than the one reached in Walker.97 In interpreting §
707(b)(2)(A)(iii) in the context of confirmation of a chapter 13 plan for an
above-median-income debtor, Judge Sawyer did not allow the deduction of
98
secured payments for collateral that will be surrendered. In In re Love,
Judge Sawyer interpreted "scheduled," in § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I), as forward
looking. That interpretation, coupled with the forward-looking approach of
"projected disposable income" in § 1325(b)(1)(B), led the court to conclude
that deducting payments for collateral that will be surrendered violates the
plain language of the statute and that an interpretation otherwise would lead
to an illogical result.99 The interpretation by the court in Love recognizes
the "logical inconsistencies in its [§ 707(b)] application to real life situations." 1° °
3.

Rebutting the Presumptionof Abuse-§ 707(b)(2)(B)

If a presumption of abuse arises under the means test, a debtor can rebut the presumption by showing special circumstances, including a serious
medical condition or a call to active duty in the armed forces. 10 1 In In re
97.
See In re Skaggs, 349 B.R. 594, 599-600 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2006); In re Harris,
353 B.R. 304 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 2006).
98.
In re Love, 350 B.R. 611 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2006).

99.

100.
101.

Id. at 615.

Id.
Section 707(b)(2)(B)(i) provides:
[D]emonstrating special circumstances, such as a serious medical condition or a call or order to active duty in the Armed Forces, to the extent
such special circumstances that justify additional expenses or adjustments of current monthly income for which there is no reasonable alternative.
(ii) In order to establish special circumstances, the debtor shall be required to itemize each additional expense or adjustment of income and
to provide(I) documentation for such expense or adjustment to income;
and
(II) a detailed explanation of the special circumstances that
make such expenses or adjustment to income necessary and
reasonable.
(iii) the debtor shall attest under oath to the accuracy of any information
provided to demonstrate that additional expenses or adjustments to income are required.
(iv) The presumption of abuse may only be rebutted if the additional expenses or adjustments to income referred to in clause (i) cause the product of the debtor's current monthly income reduced by the amounts determined under clauses (ii), (iii), and (iv) of subparagraph (A) when multiplied by 60 to be less than the lesser of(I) 25 percent of the debtor's nonpriority unsecured claims, or
$6,000, whichever is greater; or
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Johns,102 the bankruptcy court was presented with a case in which the debtors failed the means test. Under the chapter 7 means test, the debtors had
over $29,000 in disposable income, clearly exceeding the $10,000 required
for escaping a presumption of abuse under § 707(b)(2).' 0 3 The issue was
whether the debtors had special circumstances to rebut the presumption.
The burden is on the debtors to rebut the presumption.' ° 4 The debtors argued that if the case was in chapter 13, there would be no return to unsecured creditors. 10 5 The reason for the different outcome is that child support, included as income in the means test analysis, would not be income in
a chapter 13 case, and the debtors would be allowed to include 401K contributions and loan payments as deductions in chapter 13.1 6 The debtors
also asserted that in a chapter 13 case they would need to include payments
for a vehicle and a home mortgage, neither of which applied to the debtors
as they owned a vehicle and a home without debt. 107
The court rejected the debtors' position. The court reasoned that regardless of what is included or deducted, under the debtors' own numbers,
the presumption of abuse arose.10 8 The debtors' circumstances were examined under the requirements of chapter 7, and the court noted that it did not
need to consider the potential return under chapter 13.109 The court held that
a "potential payback of zero percent to unsecured creditors in a Chapter 13
is not a special circumstance."' 10 The circumstances of the debtors in In re
Johns are not of the same degree of seriousness as the examples in the statute-a serious medical illness or a call to duty in the armed forces. 111
III.

DISMISSALS FOR ABUSE UNDER § 707(B)(1) AND § 707(B)(3)

Even if an individual debtor with primarily consumer debts is able to
rebut the presumption of abuse or the presumption does not arise, a debtor's
case may still be subject to dismissal for abuse. Many scholars predicted
that most debtors would not be subject to the means test presumption of
abuse because their median income would be below the state median income. It was expected that dismissal of chapter 7 cases would hinge largely
(II) $10,000.

11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i) (2006).
102.
103.

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

In re Johns, 342 B.R. 626 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 2006).
Id. at 628.

Id. at 629.
Id. at 628-29.
Id.
Id.
In re Johns, 342 B.R. at 629.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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on the dismissal provisions in § 707(b)(3)(A) and (B), which require the
courts, in a general abuse analysis, to consider whether the filing was made
in bad faith or if "the totality of the circumstances ...of the debtor's financial situation demonstrates an abuse." ' 1 2 Early evidence suggests the prediction was true. Early issues for courts to address have been the parameters of
dismissal under these new statutory provisions of § 707(b)(1) and (3).
A.

BAD FAITH-§ 707(B)(3)(A)

There are only a few published "bad faith" cases in the post-BAPCPA
era. In these cases, the courts tend to apply the bad faith standard along
with a consideration of a totality of the circumstances standard." 4 This
makes sense since bad faith was part of the pre-BAPCPA totality of circumstances test, 115 and, as a practical matter in most cases, a consideration
13

112.
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3)(A)-(B) (2006); see also In re Haar, 360 B.R. 759 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 2007) (recognizing that the bases for dismissal under § 707(b)(2) and (b)(3) are
completely independent of each other); In re Walker, No. 05-15010-WHD, 2006 WL
1314125, at *8 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. May 1, 2006) ("In cases in which the presumption of abuse
does not arise or is rebutted, the U.S. Trustee may pursue dismissal of a debtor's case under
section 707(b)(3), which provides that the court may consider whether the 'totality of the
circumstances . ..of the debtor's financial situation demonstrates abuse."' (quoting 11
U.S.C. § 707(b)(3) (2000))).
113.
There appear to be four published decisions that specifically address bad faith
under § 707(b)(3)(A). See In re Oot, 368 B.R. 662 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007); In re Mitchell,
357 B.R. 142 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2006); In re Haney, No. 06-40350, 2006 WL 3020961, at *1
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. Oct. 19, 2006), afjd sub nom. Haney v. Clippard, No. 4:06CV-150, 2007
WL 781321, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 9, 2007); In re James, 345 B.R. 664 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa
2006). In In re Haney, the bankruptcy court considered the nondebtor spouse's income in the
analysis. In re Haney, 2006 WL 3020961, at *2. The court found that the nondebtor spouse's
income (and his significant financial resources), coupled with the debtor's conscious disregard of her financial limitations, was bad faith under the totality of the circumstances. Id.
The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court in total. Haney v. Clippard, No. 4:06CV150, 2007 WL 781321, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 9, 2007).
See, e.g., In re James, 345 B.R. 664, 667 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2006).
114.
The "totality of the circumstances" standard was created by courts as a construct
115.
for determining "substantial abuse" under the prior version of § 707(b). Eugene R. Wedoff,
Apr. 2006, at 49,
JudicialDiscretionto Find Abuse Under § 707(b)(3), AM. BANKR. INST. J.,
52. Many courts employed this construct in determining substantial abuse. Tabb &
McClelland, supra note 44, at 501; see also Green v. Staples (In re Green), 934 F.2d 568,
572 (4th Cir. 1991) (recognizing that whether the petition was filed in good faith was a factor); In re Krohn, 886 F.2d 123, 126 (6th Cir. 1989) (recognizing a debtor's good faith and
candor as a factor). One of the factors considered was whether the petition was filed in good
faith. Tabb & McClelland, supra note 44, at 501. The pre-BAPCPA case law employing this
construct should be useful in analyzing cases for abuse under the new § 707(b). See In re
Oot, 368 B.R. 662 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007) (recognizing the usefulness of prior case law to
interpret bad faith in the post-BAPCPA era); Wedoff, supra, at 52. However, some scholars
have questioned the extent of the applicability of pre-BAPCPA case law in interpreting the
totality of the circumstances test. Tabb & McClelland, supra note 44, at 501-02.
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of the totality of circumstances, rather than a single factor or circumstance,
would be needed to reach a conclusion of bad faith. 1 6 Additionally, it
would seem that most motions to dismiss for bad faith would also be considered under the totality of the circumstances,' 17 but not necessarily vice
versa.' 18 To date, it appears that there is only one reported decision in which
the dismissal was based solely on bad faith
and not on bad faith coupled
9
with the totality of the circumstances test."
The reported cases have one thing in common. Each case is a clear example of a debtor who was not "unfortunate" and who had the ability to pay
some portion of his debts. It is also an example of where granting a discharge under chapter 7 would undermine the fundamental purpose of the
chapter 7 discharge. 120 The early post-BAPCPA jurisprudence on this issue
seems to be setting a high standard for establishing bad faith. This is consistent with most pre-BAPCPA
case law, which limited bad faith to only
' 21
"egregious cases."'

An early case that analyzed bad faith under § 707(b)(3)(A), which was
actually brought under bad faith and the "totality of the circumstances," was
116.
Since pre-BAPCPA cases employed good faith as part of the totality of circumstances analysis, it seems natural that bad faith and totality of the circumstances would be
considered in the post-BAPCPA world. Even if a motion alleged only bad faith, implicit into
that inquiry would be the facts and circumstances of the case that rise to the level of bad
faith in the aggregate. In effect, a bad faith analysis will be a totality of the circumstances
analysis. See, e.g., In re Mitchell, 357 B.R. 142, 153-55 & n.1 1 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2006). In a
pure bad faith case brought only under § 707(b)(3)(A), Judge Robles considered a host of
factors to determine if bad faith existed. Id. Judge Robles expressly recognized possible
confusion of this type of analysis with the new "totality of the circumstances" and avoided
characterizing the bad faith test employed under § 707(b)(3)(A) as a "totality of circumstances test." Id. As the Sixth Circuit has recognized, the "smell test" will determine what is
"bad faith." In re Zick, 931 F.2d 1124, 1129 (6th Cir. 1991). Bad faith is an "amorphous
notion, largely defined by factual inquiry." In re Charfoos, 979 F.2d 390, 393 (6th Cir.
1992). There is no exhaustive list of "factors that could be relevant in analyzing a particular
debtor's good faith." Id.
It is possible that a particular fact or circumstance could arise, in and of itself, to
constitute bad faith, but the more likely scenario would be a host of cumulative factors leading to a finding of bad faith. To date, most cases that consider bad faith seem to do so in the
context of both bad faith and the totality of circumstances, with the analysis overlapping the
two. See, e.g., In re James, 345 B.R. 664 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2006).
117.
Judge Speer recognized that the facts in a case before him satisfied a finding of
bad faith, but also, along with other facts, supported dismissal under the totality of the circumstances. In re Oot, 368 B.R. 662 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007).
118.
See, e.g., In re Love, 350 B.R. 611 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2006).
119.
In re Mitchell, 357 B.R. 142 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2006).
120.
See, e.g., Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (recognizing that
the purpose of bankruptcy discharge is to provide a fresh start to honest but unfortunate
debtors who lack the ability to pay debts as they come due).
121.
See In re Haney, No. 06-40350, 2006 WL 3020961, at *1 (Bankr. W.D. Ky.
Oct. 19, 2006).
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In re James.122 The debtor had only $24,000 in unsecured debt and, over the
four months prior to the filing, received employment bonuses totaling
nearly $14,000. The debtor also was entitled to a federal income tax return. 123 The debtor did not use these monies to reduce the unsecured debt

but rather spent the money on a host of unnecessary expenditures, including
gifts, a new kennel and shock collar for his dog, a new gun, a bowling ball
and bag, hunting boots, a snow blower, a new washer and dryer, and a trip
to a professional football game.' 24 During this spending spree prior to bankruptcy, the
debtor was looking for a lawyer to represent him in a bank5
12

ruptcy.

During the spending spree, the debtor did not incur new debt, but the
court found the conduct "recklessly wasteful."'12 6 Particularly important to
the court was the fact that the spending was done with the intent to file
bankruptcy and that the debtor did not attempt to reduce his unsecured
debts. 127 In this context, the court found that discharging the debt would
constitute bad faith under § 707(b)(3)(A).128 It is worth noting that the court
recognized that the debtor probably could benefit from the relief based on
his schedules and certain ongoing medical expenses, but the "bad faith"

122.
123.
124.
125.

126.
127.

In re James, 345 B.R. 664, 667 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2006).
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id. at 668.
Id. The debtor asserted that frivolous spending and immature behavior should

not be the standard for bad faith dismissal. The court rejected those arguments. As the court

wrote in its opinion,
James defends the motion by admitting that what he did was im-

mature and that many, but not all, of the expenditures were frivolous.
But, he argues, frivolous spending cannot be the standardfor badfaith,
because if it were, many improvident debtors would be denied protection

in bankruptcy. James asserts that bad faith connotes a calculated, inten-

tional design to harm creditors, not merely lavish spending on the eve of
bankruptcy.
I disagree. To be sure, many debtors spend unwisely as they descend financially into insolvency. But that does not mean each is doing
so with an eye toward discharging his unpaid debts. Moreover, James's
spending did not lack the element of calculation.He testified that as opposed to paying any of his debts, he chose to enjoy the bonus money as a

reward. He chose this use of the money at a time when he was contem-

plating bankruptcy.
In re James, 345 B.R. 664, 668 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2006) (emphasis added).
128.
Id. In reaching the holding of bad faith, Judge Edmonds expressly considered

the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 667. The motion by the U.S. Trustee was under both
bad faith (§ 707(b)(3)(A)) and the "totality of the circumstances" (§ 707(b)(3)(B)). Id.
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exhibited by the debtor precluded him from obtaining relief under chapter
7.129

In re James is also useful because it provides a few simple definitions
of important terms in the post-BAPCPA era: abuse and bad faith. Judge
William Edmonds defined "abuse" under § 707(b)(1) as follows: "I consider an abuse to be a misuse of the bankruptcy provisions, to use them
wrongly or improperly."' 130 Judge Edmonds defined "bad faith" as follows:
"I consider that bad faith has taken place when a debtor files a bankruptcy
petition with motives that lack honesty of purpose or fair dealing."' 3' Particular definitions of abuse and good faith will vary slightly from circuit to
circuit as each will have its own case law defining abuse in the context of
pre-BAPCPA substantial abuse cases and prior case law in chapters 11 and
13 and possibly in chapter 7132 that define good faith. Nevertheless, the
James decision's definitions are good starting points.
A more recent case, In re Oot, 13 3 which as with In re James134 was
grounded in both bad faith and the totality of the circumstances tests, exemplifies the kind of facts that have risen to a level of bad faith in the postBAPCPA world. 135 The debtors reaffirmed over half a million dollars in
secured debt for luxury items, such as a very expensive home, a Mercedes,
a Volvo, and a camper, in addition to incurring significant credit card debt
prior to the bankruptcy, while contributing significant monies to their retirement accounts. Furthermore, their annual income was nearly double the
median income in the state, and the debtors were relatively young. 136 There
was no catastrophic or unforeseen event that led to the filing and no mitigating or excessive expenses. 37 In addition to demonstrating a lack of candor in formulating their payment schedules, 138 the debtors had the ability to
129.
Id.
130.
Id. at 667.
131.
Id.
132.
Prior to BAPCPA, a lack of good faith as a basis for dismissal of chapter 7 cases
pursuant to § 707(a) was not universally accepted by the courts. This was based on the fact
that chapter 7 did not expressly include a good faith requirement, as did chapters 11 and 13.
See, e.g., Padilla v. Frazer (In re Padilla), 214 B.R. 496, 500 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997), afd
sub nom. Neary v. Padilla (In re Padilla), 222 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2000). In Padilla v. Frazer, the bankruptcy court found bad faith and dismissed a chapter 7 case for incurring credit
card debt in a short time frame, insider transactions, and selling personal property for gambling. I at 497-500. However, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that § 707(a) could not be used to dismiss a case based on these facts. Ua
133.
368 B.R. 662 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007).
134.
345 B.R. 664 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2006).
135.
In re Oot, 368 B.R. 662 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007).
136.
Id. at 667.
137.
Id. at 668.
138.
Id.
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"make a meaningful dent in their unsecured debt." 139 Under these facts, the
court found the case was an abuse under the bad faith standard
14 ° of §
707(b)(3)(A) or the totality of circumstances test of § 707(b)(3)(B).
Similarly egregious facts existed in the only pure bad faith published
decision, In re Mitchell.14 1 In this case, the court relied on jurisprudence
from "substantial abuse" cases, as well as the criteria for bad faith under
chapters 11 and 13, to analyze whether bad faith existed under the new §
707(b)(3)(A). 142 The criteria involved a host of factors to determine if the
debtor's intent in filing the case was consistent with the goals of chapter 7:
providing a fresh start and maximizing return to creditors.143 The court
noted that there is no single criterion that is dispositive, since "all of the
facts in a case must be evaluated."' 44
In In re Mitchell, the court found that the following facts rose to a
level that warranted a finding of bad faith: significant spending months
prior to bankruptcy on consumer goods, even after speaking to a bankruptcy
lawyer; 45 spending in great excess of income; no showing of mitigating
circumstances; significant bank deposits within six months of filing with no
explanation by the debtor; evidence of creating a "false sense of financial
solvency by lying" to a creditor; and spending nearly three times her
monthly budget. 46 Based on these facts, the court found that the petition
was filed in bad faith. 147 Beyond merely dismissing the case, the court dis-

139.
Id. at 668-69.
140.
Id. at 670.
141.
357 B.R. 142 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2006).
142.
Id. at 153-54.
143.
Id. at 154-55.
144.
Id. at 155. Furthermore, the court found that neither malice nor fraudulent intent
is required. Id.
145.
The nature and magnitude of the spending leading up to bankruptcy seem to
have influenced the court. The court found:
Regardless, as the UST has demonstrated, the Debtor spent a total of
$15,386.32 on "dining out," "women's fashions and accessories," "electronics and personal property," and "beauty treatments and related products" during the year 2005. Moreover, in the first four months of 2006
(leading up to her bankruptcy filing in May 2006), the Debtor spent
$13,531.52 on these same types of items. This amounts to an increase
from $1,282.19 average monthly spending on non-essential consumer
goods during 2005 to $3007.00 per month in the four months prior to the
Debtor's bankruptcy filing in May 2006.
Id.
146.
In re Mitchell, 357 B.R. 142, 156-57 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2006).
147.
Id. at 157 ("[Tlhe debtor has filed her petition in bad faith. The debtor is seeking
more than a 'fresh start.' She is seeking an impermissible 'head start' at the expense of her
creditors." (citing In re Vangen, 334 B.R. 241, 245 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2005))).
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missed
the case with a 180-day bar against filing another chapter 7 peti148
tion.
B.

TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES-§ 707(B)(3)(B)

1.

Generally

Inclusion of the language, "[the] totality of the circumstances ...of
the debtor's financial situation demonstrates abuse,"' 49 provides a mechanism to dismiss both above- and below-median-income debtors.1 50 This
standard of "totality of the circumstances" is not new to bankruptcy jurisprudence as courts applied this test in the context of "substantial abuse"
cases in the pre-BAPCPA era. 151 The exact parameters of the standard have
varied among the courts1 52 with most courts considering a host of factors,
53
including among others, good faith and the debtor's ability to repay debt.,
The new Code provision for bad faith modifies the case law considering bad faith as part of the "totality of the circumstances" analysis so that
bad faith may now be abuse in and of itself.' 54 As such, the pre-BAPCPA
case law regarding bad faith as part of the substantial abuse analysis may
not apply under the new statutory "totality of the circumstances" analysis.15 However, the general principles and indicia of bad faith would still
be applicable.
The other factors included in the new statutory "totality of the circumstances" test, by their nature, do not exclude anything associated with the
debtor's financial circumstances. As such, the prior case law employing the
"totality of the circumstances" standard is useful in an "abuse" analysis. It
seems that any factors associated with the debtor's financial circumstances
should be considered. However, the factors evidencing the intent or motive
of the debtor in filing and spending decisions would not fall within the new
Id. at 157-58. The court relied on 11 U.S.C. § 349, which provides,
Unless the court,for cause, orders otherwise, the dismissal of a case under this title does not bar the discharge, in a later case under this title, of
debts that were dischargeable in the case dismissed; nor does the dismissal of a case under this title prejudice the debtor with regard to the
filing of a subsequent petition under this title, except as provided in section 109(g) of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 349(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
149.
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3)(B) (2006).
150.
The amendments to the Code make no distinction in the application of the test in
§ 707(b)(3)(B) among above-median- or below-median-income debtors.
151.
Carlson, supra note 67, at 296; Tabb & McClelland, supra note 44, at 501.
152.
See discussion infra Part III.B.2-5.
153.
Tabb & McClelland, supra note 44, at 501.
154.
See supra Part II.A.
155.
Tabb & McClelland, supra note 44, at 501.
148.
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totality of the circumstances test because they would fall within an analysis
of bad faith. The distinction between the two tests-bad faith and totality of
circumstances-has not made much difference in practice because of the
overlap of the two tests in many cases. 156 As discussed below, the more
thorny issue is the role of the debtor's ability to pay in the "totality of the
circumstances" analysis.
2.

Applicability ofAbility to Pay

A threshold question for courts was whether ability to repay could be
considered as part of the totality of the circumstances test, and if that factor,
in and of itself, could constitute an abuse. 157 The answer was relatively easy
for below-median-income debtors that fell within the safe harbor of the
means test. Those debtors have never completed the detailed means test
calculation so there has never been an analysis of their ability to pay. As
discussed below, most courts have found that falling within the safe harbor
provision of § 707(b), for example, by falling below median income, does
not preclude an analysis under the totality of the circumstance standard
including ability to pay. 58 In such instances, judges can raise this issue, as
can the U.S. Trustee
or Bankruptcy Administrator, who have standing to
1 59
bring such motions.
The answer is not as clear with above-median-income debtors because
they have passed the means test. Debtors have argued that passing the
means test isolates them from dismissal through § 707(b)(3) 16° under the
totality of circumstances test when the basis is ability to pay. Courts have
generally rejected this position because the means test is not the sole way to
analyze a case for abuse based on ability to repay. 161 At least one court has
156.
See supra text accompanying notes 114-17.
157.
For a discussion and summary of the debate, see infra notes 159-63 and accompanying text.
158.
See In re Pak, 343 B.R. 239 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2006) (holding that an equal-toor below-median-income debtor may have a case dismissed for abuse under § 707(b)(3)
including ability to pay as a factor); In re Paret, 347 B.R. 12 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (noting
that the fact that a debtor was below the median income does not preclude dismissal under
totality of the circumstances, which includes consideration of ability to pay); In re Schoen,
No. 06-20864-7, 2007 WL 643295, at *4 (Bankr. D. Kan. Mar. 2, 2007) (finding that ability
to pay is a factor to consider under totality of circumstances in a case involving a belowmedian-income debtor).
159.
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(6) (2006).
160.
In re dePellegrini, 365 B.R. 830, 833 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2007).
161.
In re Mestemaker, 359 B.R. 849, 853-59 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007) (recognizing
that abuse can be found for above-median-income debtors that pass or rebut the means test
when income is in excess of monthly expenses); In re dePellegrini, 365 B.R. 830, 833
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2007) (recognizing that passing the means test was not a defense to a §
707(b)(3) motion and that the above-median-income debtor may be subject to dismissal for
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found that the means test is the "sole" way to consider a debtor's ability to
repay debts and that ability to pay, by itself, is not sufficient to warrant a
finding of abuse under a totality of the circumstances analysis. 62 This view
runs counter to a plain reading of the statute 163 and violates the underlying
policy of the amendments to § 707(b) of catching can-pay debtors because
the view actually encourages abuse' 64 and is contrary to the legislative history, which clearly indicates that ability to pay should be considered even
when there is no presumption of abuse.165 On the other end of the spectrum,
at least one post-BAPCPA decision has ruled that ability to pay will warrant
dismissal under the totality of the circumstances test. 166
This raises the pre-BAPCPA debate among the appellate courts on
whether ability to pay is sufficient for a finding of substantial abuse. The
Fourth Circuit determined that "solvency alone is not a sufficient basis for a
finding that the debtor has in fact substantially abused the provisions of
Chapter 7." 167 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit held that ability to pay debts
alone justifies dismissal for substantial abuse. 68 Further complicating the
69
issue, in the middle, between the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, are the First,
Sixth, 170 and Eighth Circuits, 171 which have ruled that ability to pay can be
abuse as the means test is not the sole test for determining abuse based on ability to repay);
see also In re McUne, 358 B.R. 397, 399 (Bankr. D. Or. 2006) (finding that "§ 707(b)(3)
permits a generalized review of a debtor's finances, as well as of other circumstances, where
the means test may have been abused in some way, or finances may have been manipulated
in order to pass the test" in a case involving a debtor against whom the presumption of abuse
did not arise). Judge Dale Somers wrote in a recent opinion that he has not found any cases
in which courts have refused to consider dismissal for abuse under § 707(b)(3). See, e.g., In
re Schoen, No. 06-2086407, 2007 WL 643295, at *3 (Bankr. D. Kan. Mar. 2, 2007).
162.
See In re Nockerts, 357 B.R. 497, 507-08 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006) (recognizing,
in a case involving an above-median-income debtor, that the debtor's ability to pa in and of
itself is not enough to warrant dismissal under the totality of the circumstances test).
163.
Tabb & McClelland, supra note 44, at 503.
164.
Carlson, supra note 67, at 298; id. at 503-04.
George H. Singer, The Year in Review: Case Law Developments Under the
165.
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer ProtectionAct of 2005, 82 N.D. L. REv. 297,
348 (2006).
166.
In re Henebury, 361 B.R. 595, 607 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007) ("Either ability to
pay or bad conduct in connection with the bankruptcy will warrant dismissal for abuse under
§ 707(b)(3)."). In a footnote of a chapter 13 case, Judge Hughes reached the conclusion that
ability to pay may justify dismissal under a totality of the circumstances, but not necessarily.
In re McGillis, 370 B.R. 720, 746 n.30 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2007).
167.
In re Green, 934 F.2d 568, 572 (4th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added).
168.
Zolg v. Kelly (In re Kelly), 841 F.2d 908, 914 (9th Cir. 1988).
169.
See In re Lamanna, 153 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1998) (ruling that ability to pay
does not require a finding of substantial abuse, but that courts are not required to look beyond the ability to repay if that warrants dismissal in a particular case).
170.
See, e.g., In re Krohn, 886 F.2d 123, 126-27 (6th Cir. 1989) (stating that the
analysis requires a comprehensive review of circumstances including situations "where
disposable income permits liquidation of [the debtor's] consumer debts with relative ease").
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sufficient to dismiss a case under the substantial abuse standard. 172 Until
appellate courts weigh in on this issue in the post-BAPCPA era in light of
the overall interpretation of § 707(b), bankruptcy courts will likely be able
to distinguish § 707(b)(3)(B) cases from the substantial abuse cases if they
wish to deviate from the pre-BAPCPA case law.
i.

Below-Median Income Cases

In the case of In re Pak,173 the debtor filed for bankruptcy under chapter 7 and had primarily consumer debts. The debtor's income was equal to
or below median income in the state, so there was no presumption of
abuse. 174 Nevertheless, the U.S. Trustee brought a motion to dismiss under
§ 707(b)(3) asserting that "the totality of the circumstances . . . of the

debtor's financial situation" made the case an abuse. 175 The debtor, at the
176
time of the motion, was earning over $100,000 and had no dependents.
The issues presented were whether the court should consider the debtor's
ability to pay a significant portion of unsecured creditors under chapter 13
177
and if post-filing changes in income should be considered in the analysis.
The court answered both questions in the affirmative.
The court thoroughly considered the issue and the two divergent views
that have arisen in the literature. One view, that of Judge Eugene Wedoff,
analyzed the point and concluded that debtors could have their case dismissed if they have the ability to pay under either § 707(b)(2) or (3), even if
they pass the means test. 17 Judge Wedoff wrote,
Because the general abuse provisions of §
707(b)(3) expressly apply when the means test has
been rebutted, "passing" the means test does not
preclude a discretionary finding of abuse by the
court. .

.

.If a debtor's overall financial circum-

171.
See U.S. Tr. v. Harris, 960 F.2d 74, 76 (8th Cir. 1992) ("[The] ability to fund a
Chapter 13 plan can be sufficient reason to dismiss a Chapter 7 petition under § 707(b)."),
aff'g 125 B.R. 254 (D.S.D. 1991).
172.
In re Henebury, 361 B.R. 595, 605 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007).
173.
In re Pak, 343 B.R. 239, 240 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2006) (mem.).
174.
Id. at 241.
175.
Id.
176.
Id.
177.
Id. at 246-47.
178.
Id. at 242.
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stances would easily allow the debtor
to repay
17 9
debts... the court may find abuse.

On the other hand, Professors Marianne Culhane and Michaela White
advance a view that is opposite to Judge Wedoff s interpretation of the statute.180 Culhane and White argue that the § 707(b)(2) means test established
a "bright line" test for dismissal based on a debtor's ability to pay. 181 They
argue that if "judges are free under § 707(b)(3) to substitute their own canpay standards 82for Congress' means test [it] would render the means test
superfluous."'
The bankruptcy court in In re Pak reasoned that actual and anticipated
income should be considered in determining projected disposable income
for chapter 13 plan confirmation purposes. 183 As such, it should be considered in a chapter 7 § 707(b)(3)(B) analysis.184 The debtor had over $5000 in
actual monthly income and, after deducting necessary expenses consistent
with a hypothetical chapter 13, the debtor could fund a plan to repay 8nine6
85
teen percent of general unsecured creditors.' The case was dismissed.
Other courts that have addressed this issue have made similar conclusions.187 In the case of In re Pennington,188 in deciding whether to dismiss
the chapter 7 petition as part of the totality of the circumstances analysis,
the court found that it must consider not only the debtor's financial condition as of the petition date, but also the debtor's financial condition at the
179.
In re Pak, 343 B.R. at 242 (quoting Eugene R. Wedoff, Means Testing in the
New § 707(b), 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 231, 236 n.8 (2005)). For a more recent treatment of the
issue by Judge Eugene Wedoff, where he directly challenges the view espoused by some
scholars that assert judges have no discretion to dismiss chapter 7 cases if the debtors can
fund a plan in cases where the debtor passes the means test, see Eugene R. Wedoff, Judicial
Discretion to Find Abuse Under § 707(b)(3), 71 Mo. L. REv. 1035 (2006). For scholarship
on the other side of the debate, see Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Catching
Can-PayDebtors: Is the Means Test the Only Way?, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 665, 67880 (2005). For an excellent treatment of the opposing views, see John A.E. Pottow, The
Totality of the Circumstances of the Debtor's Financial Situation in a Post-Means Test
World: Trying to Bridge the Wedoff/Culhane & White Divide, 71 Mo. L. REv. 1053 (2006).
180.
Culhane & White, supra note 179, at 678-80.
181.
Id. at 678-80.
182.
Id. at 680.
183.
In re Pak, 343 B.R. at 245-46.
184.
Id.
185.
Id.
186.
Id. at 247.
187.
For a recent case that reaches the same conclusion while carefully analyzing the
issue and current case law, see In re Mestemaker, 359 B.R. 849, 856 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
2007) ("Where the presumption... does not arise... [or is rebutted], the court must then
consider a debtor's actual income and expenses in determining abuse based on ability to pay
under Section 707(b)(1) and (3).").
188.
In re Pennington, 348 B.R. 647 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006).

NORTHERN ILUNOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 29

time the motion to dismiss was heard. 189 The debtors' current monthly income was below the median income in the state, and they had a projected
disposable income of $212.71 per month, which would provide a return of
42% to unsecured creditors under a three-year plan and a 69% return under
a five-year plan. 19° The Court found that the case was abusive under §
707(b)(3)(B).' 9'
The bankruptcy court in the case of In re Paret 92 reached a similar
conclusion and found,
As is manifest in section 707, a safe harbor upon entry
into which neither one's motives nor fitness for chapter 7
relief are questioned is hardly one Congress sought to
dredge. When no presumption of abuse arises under paragraph (b)(2), the Court concludes that the Code mandates
consideration of a debtor's ability to pay his creditors
193
within the test articulated in paragraph (b)(3).
ii.

Above-Median-Income Debtors

As with most of the below-median income cases, the court in In re
McUne' 94 found that even if a debtor passes the "more or less bright line"
test of the means test, the debtor is still subject to the "generalized review,
including consideration of his finances."' 95 The court reasoned that "[t]aken
as a whole, § 707 precludes the court from permitting the debtor to liquidate
under Chapter 7 when there is an ability to pay, even when other relevant
factors may favor liquidation."' 196 The ability to pay a portion of unsecured
debt is a relevant factor in a totality of the circumstances analysis. 197 The
case was heard on motion for summary judgment, so the specific facts and
ability to pay were not addressed, merely the question of law was presented.' 98
199
In a more recent above-median-income debtor case, In re Henebury,
the court applied the totality of the debtors' financial circumstances test. 200
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. at 651.
Id. at 651-52.
Id. at 652.
In re Paret, 347 B.R. 12 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006).
Id. at 15.
In re McUne, 358 B.R. 397 (Bankr. D. Or. 2006).
Id. at 399.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 398.
In re Henebury, 361 B.R. 595 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007).
Id. at 614.
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There were no allegations of bad faith, and dismissal was based solely on
the conclusion that the debtors had the ability to repay a substantial portion
of their debts upon an examination of the totality of the debtors' financial
circumstances. 20 1 The court began its ability to pay analysis with the debtors' CMI from the means test.2° 2 The court added to that figure additional
income from a teaching job that a codebtor began four days after filing the
petition.20 3 Without any adjustments to expenses, when including the debtors' additional postpetition income, the debtors could repay 100% of their
$73,799.46 in unsecured debt in under forty-three months. 204 Alternatively,
the court considered the information in Schedules I and J, and under that
ability to pay analysis, the debtors could likewise repay 100% of their unsecured debts in an even shorter timeframe. 20 5
Most cases revolve around the ability to pay factor under the totality of
the circumstances test; however, cases can still be dismissed under the totality of the circumstances test even if ability to pay is not shown. For example, in the case of In re Ashraf,2° the court found that the following facts
constituted an abuse under the totality of the circumstances:
The Court finds that the Debtors' failure to be forthright in their Schedules, including their decision not to include significant information, combined with the Debtors'
timing to file a bankruptcy petition shortly after a judgment
has been obtained by one of their creditors, reflect that
based on the "totality of the circumstances" the Debtors'
petition must be dismissed as an abuse of Chapter 7.2o7
The court did not make any finding of the debtors' ability to pay.208
The court did not rule on whether the facts satisfied a finding of bad
faith. 209 The court, in dicta, did state that the bad faith requirement would
require "egregious behavior" in the Ninth Circuit. 210 The facts in this case
of the circumstances without the
constituted an abuse under the totality
211
faith.
bad
find
specifically
to
need

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id.
Id. at 612.
Id. at 613.
Id.
In re Henebury, 361 B.R. 595, 613 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007).
In re Ashraf, 367 B.R. 151 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2007).
Id at 158.
See In re Ashraf, 367 B.R. 151.
Id. at 158.
Id. at 158 n.15.
I at 158.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

3.

[Vol. 29

Considerationof PostpetitionEvents

As reflected in the decisions above, most courts have found that postpetition events that impact the ability of a debtor to pay some or all of his
debts are relevant in a totality of the circumstances analysis .z212 This rule is
sensible for several reasons. First, this type of rule can help debtors or harm
debtors in a totality of the circumstances analysis because under this rule
both positive and negative events to the debtor's financial situation should
be considered. 3 Second, the rule is consistent with cases that adopt a forward-looking analysis of income and expenses in the context of a chapter
13 plan.2 14 Third, it provides a realistic analysis of the debtor's ability to
repay and does not tie the court's hands to carry out the intent of the legislation: to catch the can-pay debtors. 215
Notably, this consideration of postpetition events, specifically, in21 6
creases or decreases in income, applies only to general abuse motions.
Postpetition income changes do not seem relevant for presumption of abuse
motions, 217 except to the extent that
decreases in income are shown by the
debtor to rebut the presumption. 8
4.

Proving Ability to Pay

Implicitly and often explicitly, the ability to pay analysis is, in effect, a
hypothetical chapter 13 analysis. As such, a debtor's projected disposable
income becomes an important issue in a hypothetical chapter 13 analysis
212.
In re Lenton, 358 B.R. 651, 664 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006) ("[T]he court must
consider [a debtor's] actual and anticipated financial situation over the applicable Chapter 13
commitment period."). See generally In re Hare, No. 06-10924-B-7, 2007 WL 201249, at *3
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2007) (noting that an above-median-income debtor's actual ability
to pay a substantial portion of debts in light of the surrender of their residence in bankruptcy
was relevant to the totality of the circumstances analysis); In re Richie, 353 B.R. 569
(Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006); In re Pennington, 348 B.R. 647 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006); In re Paret,
347 B.R. 12 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006); In re Pak, 343 B.R. 239 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2006).
213.
See, e.g., In re Pennington, 348 B.R. 647,651 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006).
214.
In re Henebury, 361 B.R. 595, 610 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007).
215.
See Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Catching Can-PayDebtors:Is
the Means Test the Only Way?, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 665, 677-82 (2005).
216.
See, e.g., Rafael I. Pardo, Analyzing Chapter 7 Abuse Dismissal Motions PostBAPCPA: A Reply on Cortez, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec.-Jan. 2007, at 16, 87 ("Only when
the presumption does not arise or when it has been rebutted does it appear that a court will
have a meaningful opportunity to evaluate the effect of a postpetition increase in the debtor's
income."). It seems that beyond increases to income, decreases to income should likewise be
considered in § 707(b)(1) motions. In re Pennington, 348 B.R. at 651.
217.
For an analysis indicating otherwise, see Justin H. Dion, Timing Is Everything..
or Is It: Cortez Challenges the "Snapshot" Approach to Analyzing Abuse Pursuant to
707(b), AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2006, at 1.

218.

Pardo, supra note 216, at 87.
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because, in the context of an objection to the confirmation of a chapter 13
plan, the debtor must provide "projected disposable income" under the plan
to unsecured creditors. 21 9 Chapter 13 jurisprudence in the post-BAPCPA
era indicates that projected disposable income depends on whether the
debtor is below or above the median income.
For below-median-income debtors, some courts take current monthly
income from Part 1 of Form B22C and, in light of the fact that these debtors
do not complete the calculation of means test deductions on Official Form
22 ° Other courts
B22C, employ Schedule J for a calculation of 2 expenses.
2
1
begin and end the inquiry with Schedules I and j.
The analysis for above-median-income debtors is more complicated
because above-median-income debtors have completed the detailed means
test. The issue becomes whether the disposable income under § 1325(b)(2)
from Form B22C is dispositive or is merely a starting point on what is "projected disposable income." Some courts have held that disposable income is
not determined by Schedules I and J but rather by Form B22C using the
calculation in § 707(b)(2)(A) and (B). 222 However, other courts have found
that "projected disposable income" and "disposable income" are not synonymous and have rejected the mechanical application of Form B22C and
look to Schedules I and j. 223 Courts that have adopted the former approach
may not permit a different analysis in a § 707(b)(1) abuse analysis. However, since the inquiry is different, strong arguments can be made that the
line of authority in chapter 13 confirmation is not controlling in an abuse
analysis.224
5.

How Much Debt-PayingAbility is Abusive?

An issue addressed by the courts is how much a debtor needs to be
able to pay back in order for the filing to be considered an abuse in those
cases where the debtor falls within a safe harbor, the presumption of abuse
219.
220.

11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) (2006).

In re Alexander, 344 B.R. 742, 746 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006) (taking the below-

median-income debtor's current monthly income reported on Part 1 of Form B22C and

subtracting the total monthly expenses reported on Schedule J).
E.g., In re Dew, 344 B.R. 655, 660-61 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2006).
221.
In re Miller, 361 B.R. 224, 227-28 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2007).
222.
See In re Edmunds, 350 B.R. 636, 644 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2006) (rejecting me223.
chanical application of the mathematical calculation of Form B22C); In re Kibbe, 342 B.R.
411, 415 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2006) (noting that to give effect to the word "projected" under §
1325(b)(1)(B), the court had to find that disposable income must be determined by reference
to Schedules I and J).
See In re Henebury, 361 B.R. 595, 612 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007) (recognizing
224.
that chapter 13 cases on this point can be instructive, but are not controlling as the matter
before the court is not confirmation).
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has not arisen, or the presumption was rebutted. Judge Wedoff has argued
in his writings that the level of debt-paying ability should be the same as the
abuse threshold under the means test. 25 He argues that "[s]ince the abuse
threshold cannot be challenged through the means test, there is a clear policy judgment that the threshold fixed the level at which debt-paying ability
becomes abusive of Chapter 7. " 226 This policy rationale is logical and is
consistent with the intent of Congress in enacting the new § 707(b)catching can-pay debtors. Those below the statutorily established threshold
are not can-pay debtors.
Several courts have expressly adopted the threshold as advocated by
Judge Wedoff in the means test.227 For example, the court in In re Mestemaker228 found that
[w]hen judges are required to make determinations of
abuse under § 707(b)(3), they should accordingly use the
means-test threshold: If a debtor's actual disposable income, determined by the court, is below that threshold,
there should be no finding of abuse based on debt-paying
ability; if disposable income meets or exceeds the threshold, abuse should be found.22 9
Table 1 reflects some recent decisions and levels of debt-paying ability
that constituted an abuse. The range is from the abuse threshold of the
means test up to a 100% ability to repay unsecured creditors.
Table 1:Level of Debt-Paying Ability Constituting an Abuse Under § 707(b)(3)
Percentage or Threshold Amount
Authority
Standard in § 707(b)(2)(i)(I)-(l): 25% of
Eugene R. Wedoff, JudicialDiscretionto Find
nonpriority unsecured claims or $6000, whichAbuse Under § 707(b)(3), 71 Mo. L. REV.
ever is greater, or $10,000
1036, 1047 (2007).
Debtor's ability to fund plan and to pay
In re Mestemaker, 359 B.R. 849, 858 (Bankr.
$18,000 exceeded statutory threshold
N.D. Ohio 2007).
Pay meaningful percentage of debts
In re dePellegrini,365 B.R. 830 (Bankr. S.D.
(estimated 25%-40% over 60 months)
Ohio 2007).
57%
In re Freis,No. 06-30393, 2007 WL 1577752,
at *1 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. May 18, 2007).
100% over 60 months
In re Henebury, 361 B.R. 595 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 2007).*
Court did not specify the percentage, but found
In re Hare, No. 06-10924-B-7, 2007 WL
that debtors could pay "substantial portion of
201249, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2007).
unsecured debtors through a chapter 13 plan"
*Ability to repay alone is sufficient to warrant dismissal.

225.
Wedoff, supra note 82, at 1047.
226.
Id
227.
In re Mestemaker, 359 B.R. 849, 854-55 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007); In re Pennington, 348 B.R. 647, 651-52 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006).
228.
In re Mestemaker, 359 B.R. at 854-55.
229.
Id
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IV.

DISMISSAL FOR CAUSE UNDER § 707(A)

If a debtor does not satisfy the threshold requirements of § 707(b)being an individual debtor with primarily consumer debts-then the dismissal provisions of § 707(b) are not applicable.23 ° In such instances, dismissal may be possible for "cause" under § 707(a). Likewise, if dismissal is
not available for an individual consumer debtor under § 707(b), dismissal
231 It seems that in the latter situation the
may be possible under § 707(a). 23
BA would not need to resort to § 707(a), but creditors may be forced to use
§ 707(a) for below-median-income debtors.
Prior case law and debates about what constitutes "cause" outside 2of32
the enumerated grounds of § 707(a), specifically a lack of "good faith,"
would still be ripe for continued debate.23 3 Amended § 707(b), by including
bad faith as a ground for dismissal for abuse, has likely ended any argument
that an individual debtor with primarily consumer debts is subject to dismissal under § 707(a) for cause under a lack of good faith theory.234 However, in cases in which the debtor's debts are not primarily consumer debts,
§ 707(a) and lack of good faith may still be a possible avenue warranting
dismissal if it was permitted in a particular jurisdiction prior to BAPCPA.23 5
See In re Sudderth, No. 06-10660, 2007 WL 119141, at *1 (Bankr. M.D.N.C.
230.
Jan. 9, 2007).
See id. at *2 n. 1.
231.
Id. at *2 ("There is widespread debate on the subject of whether there is a good232.
faith filing requirement in Chapter 7 cases and whether the absence of good faith is a ground
for dismissal of a Chapter 7 case.").
See, e.g., In re Lombardo, 370 B.R. 506, 510-11 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2007) (dis233.
cussing the conflict among the appellate courts regarding whether a lack of good faith constitutes "cause" under § 707(a) in a post-BAPCPA case).

See, e.g., 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 707.03[2] (Allan N. Resnick & Henry J.
234.
Sommer eds., 15th ed. rev. 2008). However, at least one court in the post-BAPCPA era has
dismissed a debtor with primarily consumer debts under § 707(a) under a bad faith analysis
that included a consideration of the totality of the circumstances test (including ability to pay
as one factor among many) employed by courts prior to BAPCPA. See In re Lombardo, 370
B.R. 506 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y 2007).
235.
Prior to BAPCPA, there was a split among the courts as to whether "bad faith"
constituted cause. As to nonconsumer cases, those cases would be applicable in the postBAPCPA era to the extent that dismissals for nonconsumer cases were based on "bad faith"
under § 707(a). The Third and Sixth Circuits found that bad faith can provide cause for
dismissal under § 707(a). See, e.g., In re Tamecki, 229 F.3d 205, 207 (3d Cir. 2000); see
also Bradley R. Tamm, SubstantialAbuse Dismissal Under 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b): Evolution
or Malignancy, 13 J. BANKR. L. & PRAc. 6 Art. 2, pt. VIII.A (2004) (citing In re Zick, 931
F.2d 1124, 1127 (6th Cir. 1991) (noting that bad faith can provide cause for a § 707(a) dismissal); In re Lacrosse, 244 B.R. 583, 587 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1999) (finding that lack of good
faith in filing warranted dismissal of chapter 7 petition); In re Smith, 229 B.R. 895, 897
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1997) (finding that lack of good faith constituted "cause" for dismissal of
chapter 7 case); In re Griffieth, 209 B.R. 823, 831 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding dismissal warranted under § 707(a) because the debtors' case was not filed in good faith); In re
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CONCLUSION

The parameters of dismissal for abuse under § 707(b)(1) and (3) are
still evolving. The continued use of § 707(a), particularly against consumer
debtors, will eventually be fully tested in the courts by creditors. These are
some of the early cases that have worked through the application of the
statute to real-life situations, and as lawyers bring more issues to the courts
to address, the body of case law will continue to develop.23 6 It is not likely
that any meaningful issues will be resolved, at least not anytime in the near
future.237 The players in the system will continue to "muddle through" to
make the bankruptcy system workable.
Recognizing the posture that we are in the bankruptcy process, several points worth remembering in the area of § 707(b) in the post-BAPCPA
era:
1. The means test is a "paper tiger" with little apparent impact on the
type of relief afforded to a debtor because most chapter 7 debtors
pass the means test. This needs to be empirically tested, but it is
too close to the passage of BAPCPA to be able to obtain any data
that can be tested empirically.
2. In light of this ever-apparent fact, most litigation and areas of development in the courts will arise under the general abuse standard.

Sky Group Int'l, Inc., 108 B.R. 86, 90 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989) (noting that bad faith can
result in dismissal under the section)). The Eighth and Ninth Circuits, as well as other courts,
have taken the opposite position. See, e.g., In re Padilla, 222 F.3d 1184, 1191 (9th Cir. 2000)
("Bad faith as a general proposition does not provide 'cause' to dismiss a Chapter 7 petition
under § 707(a)."); see also Bradley R. Tamm, Substantial Abuse Dismissal Under 11
U.S.C.A. § 707(b): Evolution or Malignancy, 13 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 6 Art. 2, pt. VIII.A
(2004) (citing In re Huckfeldt, 39 F.3d 839, 832 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that while some
conduct giving rise to dismissal under § 707(a) may be characterized as bad faith, the issue
is properly whether the petition should be dismissed "for cause"); In re Etcheverry, 242 B.R.
503, 506 (D. Colo. 1999) (noting that there is an explicit "good faith" requirement in chapter
7 and therefore bad faith cannot constitute "cause" for dismissal); In re Landes, 195 B.R.
855, 855 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding that good faith requirement cannot be read into the
section)).
236.
For an interesting overview of the response to the developing case law by the
judiciary and the lawyers in practice since the enactment of the BAPCPA, see Jean
Braucher, The Challenge to the Bench and Bar Presented by the 2005 Bankruptcy Act: Resistance Need Not Be Futile, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 93 (2007).
237.
See, e.g., Thomas R. Waldron & Neil M. Berman, Principled Principles of
Statutory Interpretation: A Judicial Perspective After Two Years of BAPCPA, 81 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 195, 195-96 (2007) (recognizing that there are a growing number of decisions in
a wide array of areas under BAPCPA, but the differences in their outcomes are so wide that
there is no way to have any predictability or uniformity in outcomes of individual cases).
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3. The analysis under the generalized abuse standard-whether applying the bad faith standard, the totality of the circumstances
standard, or a combination of both-is essentially a question of
whether the debtor can fund a meaningful plan, and if so, to determine whether there are any mitigating factors. Certainly there
may be situations of pure bad faith where ability to pay is not a
consideration, but in most cases it will be an important factor.
With that said, ability to pay should not always dictate the outcome. The ability to pay in some cases may not be enough to warrant a finding of abuse. The outcomes will be driven by the facts
of the case being considered. Fair outcomes require the playersparticularly the UST, BA, and the courts-to be mindful of the
role they play in the implementation of BAPCPA. Most of the
meaningful areas of reform, if any, will come from the implementation of BAPCPA. This requires the wise exercise of discretion in
interpreting and carrying out the language of the Code.
4. Even in situations where there is no basis for dismissal under §
707(b), there may be cases that warrant a challenge under §
707(a). The Code does not address all the factual situations in
which the bankruptcy system is affording relief only to honest but
unfortunate debtors. In those rare instances where debtors "slip"
through the cracks, § 707(a) may be a tool to actually curb abusive
filings within that statutory framework.
Finally, beyond the challenges for the players in the bankruptcy system, policymakers must be open to changes and improvements. The players
in the system can only do so much to work with the framework provided by
Congress. The Code has evolved dramatically since its creation with the
Bankruptcy Act of 1978. The Code has been amended numerous times
since 1978, prior to BAPCPA, with significant amendments in 1984, 1986,
and 1994.238 With each change, there are required future changes and modifications by Congress. Future changes should be based on sound empirical
evidence and information from the players in the system with daily experience with the gaps and problems of the framework. Otherwise, we will be
left with a system that "works," but which may not actually be improved in
the long run.
This may very well be the case in the area of attacking the perceived
abuses of chapter 7 with the application of BAPCPA's means test. The application of the safe harbor, the means test, and rebutting the presumption
of abuse may not only be insufficient for debtors to obtain the requested

238.
See Vicki W. Travis, Of the Latest Attempted Revisions of the Bankruptcy Code:
Can They Really ChangeAnything?, 16 BANKR. DEV. J. 221,226-32 (1999).
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relief, the complex framework may not be enough to lead to any improvements in the overall bankruptcy system. Time will tell.

